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ABSTRACT
Technological improvements, declining costs and mandates to suppliers from large entities such as Wal-Mart and the
Department of Defense are driving investments in RFID and other location aware systems (LAS). Expected benefits from
LAS investments include improvements in supply chain integration and streamlined operations. However, LAS may
introduce a number of new information security vulnerabilities into organizations that must be carefully considered. LAS are
highly decentralized and mobile, yet must connect to existing transactional systems to function. Decentralized, mobile
applications are especially difficult to secure, and connections between LAS and internal applications can put those systems
at risk too. The additional complexity of overall systems architectures also makes identifying security risks more challenging.
We assert that current guidelines for information security are increasingly insufficient for organizations with highly
decentralized systems and that more attention to how systems are employed is needed. We demonstrate this point with logical
process models that illustrate how two different uses of one LAS technology result in different information security risks.
Keywords: Security, Location Aware Systems, RFID.
INTRODUCTION
The number of information system security management challenges facing organizations today is increasing for several
reasons. One contributing factor is the growing number of portable devices and mobile technologies being adopted for
strategic purposes. Many business and military organization have recently made significant investments in special location
aware mobile technologies such as RFID and GPS to enhance business processes and military supplies management. If
effectively implemented, information about an asset’s specific location as well as any additional information recorded about
the asset on an attached tag or device may be remotely accessed by the organizations implementing the location aware system
(LAS). The availability of such information is expected to improve asset management and reduce opportunities for theft
while the ability to remotely collect and read data on the device attached to the asset is expected to reduce supply chain
management time and errors and ultimately improve profitability.
Most research on decentralized mobile applications has focused on the potential improvements in efficiency and effectiveness
that organizations may attain from using mobile systems. However, information security risks associated with their
deployment must be addressed before systems are fully trustworthy to their authorized users.  Evidence of serious security
breaches made possible through poorly secured mobile systems are beginning to emerge (Poulsen, 2005), yet fewer than ten
percent of organizations have developed a formal and comprehensive mobile security policy (Firstbrook, 2005).
In this research in progress, we argue that the increasing complexity of systems and the diversity of systems use in highly
decentralized and mobile environments requires a more formal approach to security risk assessment than companies have
historically used with internally managed systems. Our evolving analysis is designed to illustrate how logical models of
systems processes are a useful addition to the security manager’s arsenal. Logical models of organizational and business
processes have been used in the past as aids in the analysis and design of complex information systems and by the accounting
profession for mapping internal controls and processes within organizations. Many companies, including General Electric,
IBM, and NASA, have re-discovered the usefulness of logical modeling techniques to better understand the underlying
business and work processes enabled by the variety of systems used (Jacka, et al., 2001; Hunt, 1996; Alter, 2001; Janz et al.,
2005). We propose that these logical models may also be useful tools for assessing and managing information systems risk
for complex environments such as highly distributed mobile systems environments. Accordingly, we advocate use of the
familiar technique of logical modeling, but for analysis of information systems risk, especially where information systems are
highly decentralized and mobile, as they are in location aware systems. In the following sections, we discuss information
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security management challenges resulting from increasing decentralization and mobility of systems, the current state of the
art in security management guidance and how logical models may be used to fill some of the security guidance gaps,
particularly for mobile, decentralized systems.
INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES
Some electronic transactions are digitized versions of older processes while other transactions and electronic activities
involve completely new processes. Web-based EDI, for example, is one type of Internet transaction that is similar to its
predecessor, traditional EDI. Accordingly, appropriate security polices and procedures for traditional EDI can be readily
adapted to web-based EDI. Yet, web-based EDI faces additional security challenges associated with use of the Internet as the
medium for communication that must also be considered.
Other electronic transactions involve digitization of processes that were previously analog or otherwise in a different
electronic format. Face-to-face meetings and telephone calls are now often replaced by e-mail, exchange of electronic
working documents, virtual meetings and teleconferencing. Similarly, business processes such as sales and inventory control
are increasingly digitized and automated through the combined use of new inter-organizational processes and newer
technologies such as RFID tags or other location aware technologies. When mapping out a security management plan,
businesses must consider how use of new electronic systems affect security risk while simultaneously considering the
security risks inherent to the new technologies.
The volume of electronic business activity, the value of information shared per exchange and society’s reliance on
information systems all continue to grow, yet information systems often have little or no security built into their architecture
(Power, 2002). A recent survey of information security professionals reveals that IT security budgets appear to be around 6-
8% of overall IT budgets in developed countries and lower in other regions (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2003). Findings from
a CIO Magazine survey (2002) are consistent and further found that CIOs surveyed reported an average of seven security
breaches a year and 63% of the respondents believe investment in information security at their organization needs to increase.
The challenge for security professionals is to identify a holistic view of the security management issues in an environment
where systems complexity and security threats are increasing simultaneously. In the next section, we discuss the current state
of the art in security management.
SECURITY MANAGEMENT STATE OF THE ART
Information security guidance for protecting access points, networks, physical devices, data and other systems elements has
typically either been strategic-level, top down guidance or bottom up technology specific guidance. Examples of top down
guidance include the Information Systems Audit and Control Organization’s Control Objectives for Information and related
Technology (COBIT), the International Standards Organization’s ISO17799 and portions of the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Service’s Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Examples of bottom up guidance
include specific administrative procedures for securing a UNIX platform, appropriate encryption methods for securing the
802.11b wireless network protocol and appropriate password management techniques for a specific end-user application
(Hesseldahl, 2004; Keizer, 2003; Power, 2004; Soderborg, 2003; Sullivan, 2005; Zviran, 1999). Information security research
focused on theoretical development and further improvement of strategic-level, top down information security guidance
continues to progress as well (Nance and Straub, 1988; Straub and Welke, 1998; Sherer and Alter, 2004; Alter and Sherer,
2004; Deshmuhk, 2004).
The bottom up approach to information security management, when used alone, is inefficient because individual technologies
continue to evolve and also because organizations may change technologies for a given application or even employ multiple
technologies in parallel to perform the same application functions for different users. Using only a bottom up approach to
security is also ineffective because the impact of a technology’s interaction with other systems to which it connects and use-
related risks are less likely to be visible through a bottom-up lens that focuses primarily on technology-specific
characteristics. In fact, to date there has also been little discussion in the academic or professional literatures about the
possible interaction between alternative uses of systems and risk.  For example, are there different risks associated with a
system that processes information by pushing it through the system versus a system that pulls information if both systems use
the same hardware, software and networks?
Strategic frameworks such as ISO17799 and COBIT have been a useful starting point for many organizations because the
frameworks are implementation-neutral and generalizable across companies and industries. However, there still remains little
research or professional guidance on how an organization should go about mapping a strategic framework such as ISO17799
to a unique implementation of systems components for completion of specific organizational processes.
In the next section, we demonstrate the potential usefulness of logical models as a complement to existing strategic
frameworks and bottom up methods for assessing information security risk in highly decentralized, mobile environments.
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LOGICAL MODEL EXAMPLE: LBS
We use location based systems (LBS) for illustrative purposes because LBS are loosely connected systems with multiple
current technological deployments (e.g., GPS, RFID, ActiveBat, Cricket) and because LBS are emerging as popular means
for conducting a wide range of business transactions (Mitchell and Whitmore, 2003). The characteristics of technological
diversity and immaturity, as well as expected growth in use make LBS an attractive candidate for testing our theoretical
approach to security management. The diversity of technologies and applications of LBS are apparent from consideration of
just a few emerging sample uses: cell phone applications to help locate the nearest gas and food, transportation management
systems for optimizing routes and tracking assets and inventory management of consumer goods as they move from
manufacturing to warehousing to retail outlets.
We begin by focusing on the logical process of determining the relative positioning of two or more objects participating in an
LBS process. At a fundamental level, all location based applications aim to determine with reasonable accuracy the relative
position of one object, the object being located, to an object collecting the location information or external referencing
scheme in order to provide value-added services at the point of the object being located. Example services provided may
include anything from simply performing inventory updates within a warehouse, monitoring the movement of assets, and
providing specific value-added content back to an object based on location-specific information. We refer to the objects being
located as locatable objects, and the objects performing location data collection as location collection objects. A locatable
object is any object that can have its location derived using a location collection process. A location collection process is then
an interaction between locatable objects and location collection objects and involves the transmission of location data from a
locatable object to a location collection object (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Logical Model
The location data that is transmitted during a location process contains two fundamental properties: an object reference and a
location reference. Additionally a temporal reference determining the time for which the location reference is valid can be
sent in explicit or implicit form (Rodden, Friday, Muller and Dix, 2002). The object reference is used to denote uniqueness or
class membership such as a product code, for the locatable object. In some cases, the object reference might be transmitted as
actual data or conversely, implied within the properties of the signal itself (e.g., a specific radio signature). The location
reference is defined within the spatial context of the location process and can consist of explicit, derivable, or implied
location information. Explicit location references, such as a geographical coordinate, place the locatable object in an external
spatial context such as the global coordinate system. A GPS-enabled transponder, for example, can transmit the actual
geographic coordinate of the device. Derivable location references require the use of external positioning techniques to
determine the location of the locatable object based on the physical properties of the transmission. A cell phone can be
located with some degree of accuracy using triangulation methods, for example. Lastly, implied location references place the
locatable object in the spatial context of a collection object based on a Boolean result of a collection process, i.e., the object is
either there or it is not. The presence of an RFID tag, for example, can only be detected when it is within spatial proximity to
a suitable reader.
A location collection process is initiated by a location event. A location event results in location data being transmitted and
can originate from either locatable objects or location collection objects. When a locatable object initiates a location event the
collection process is defined in this paper as a “Push” system. Conversely, when a location collection object initiates a
location event the collection process is defined here as a “Pull” system.
Push Systems
Push systems are characterized by locatable objects which initiate location events (Figure 2).
 3339
Ray and Ray                                                                      Application Use in Security Risk Assessment of Decentralized, Mobile Applications
Proceedings of the Eleventh Americas Conference on Information Systems, Omaha, NE, USA August 11th-14th 2005
Figure 2. Push System
The transmission of location data in Push systems requires an internally generated signal and power source and the location
data is generally broadcast based on a location event initiated by the locatable object. Push technologies have the capability to
initiate the dissemination of location data and have little or no control over the number and nature of the collection objects
which receive the location data. Technologies in this category include devices such as GPS-enabled transponders, cell phones
that can be located via triangulation methods, angle of arrival (AOA), time of arrival (TOA) and radio-beacons such as those
used to guide aircraft or locate aircraft black-boxes. Active RFID tags also belong in this category as once activated they can
transmit location data without being in proximity to a reader.
Pull Systems
In contrast to push systems, location event data in pull systems is transmitted in response to a location process initiated by a
location collection object. The location event initiator in this case is a location collection object that queries a locatable object
for its location information. During the location process, the location collection object broadcasts a query to one or more
locatable objects, which respond with location data (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Pull System
With pull systems, the location of an object is usually mapped into the location context of the collection object. An RFID
scanner inventorying objects passing through a doorway, for example, will retrieve the RFID identifier and instantaneously
determine the location of the object relative to the scanner. The location context of the scanner is restricted to the “scan
tunnel,” i.e., the concept of location in this example is a Boolean: the object is either present in the “scanned” space or it is
not. Applying this concept, we can also place UPCs and bar-scanners in the same framework. The location of the UPC reader
sets the location context of locatable objects (i.e. objects with bar codes). The only difference between the UPC and RFID
technologies for purposes of this model is that UPCs require line-of-site and therefore have a significantly restricted location
context. UPC scanners can also inventory objects one at a time.
APPLICATION OF SECURITY PRINCIPLES TO LOGICAL DESIGN
Three information security principles are common to most strategic frameworks: information integrity, confidentiality and
availability (Bishop, 2003). Information integrity refers to the trustworthiness of data content and data sources, information
confidentiality refers to protection of data from unauthorized users and uses and information availability refers to assurance
that data sharing processes are protected from interruption. Table 1 provides examples of general information security threats
in each of these three categories of security services. Note that some threats are against multiple security services. Consider
further that each threat may be associated with multiple methods of attack. For example, categories of individuals who may
attempt to intercept and collect (read) data include employees, former employees, random hackers, competitors or terrorists.
Similarly, methods employed for interception and collection of data may include stealing or hacking a password of a
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legitimate user, tapping into the communications medium, breaking into the database where desired information is stored,
modifying an application program to change routing of information or theft of a computer or device that will allow access to
the desired information. While some efforts to expand categorization of security services beyond these three elements exist,
not all security professionals and researchers agree on the expanded models, but most will agree to the generalizability and
importance of integrity, confidentiality and availability.
Integrity Confidentiality Availability
Intercepting and modifying data
Poor data quality controls
Destruction of data
Malicious code
Intercepting and collecting data
Intercepting and modifying data
Malicious code
Poaching network services
Denial of service
Malicious code
Table 1. Information Security Services and Security Threats
SAMPLE APPLICATION OF SECURITY PRINCIPLES TO LBS EVENT MODEL
To illustrate a logical design approach to analyzing security issues in location based systems, we apply the three security
services described above and the logical model of LBS defined earlier to a simple example from electronic supply chain
integration. The problem we analyze requires providing visibility of palletized goods as they move from manufacturer to
warehouse. In the first part of the example we look at a push system implementation, which will typically involve either
attaching a locatable object to a shipping container containing the pallets or to the vehicle transporting the pallets. We then
perform the same analysis for a pull system which will typically involve tagging individual pallets or pallet contents using
low-cost RFID tags. Results are shown in Table 2.
Our goal in performing this exercise is to illustrate how important considerations for ensuring information security are more
readily apparent when using a logical system design, and to further illustrate how different model designs necessitate
different approaches to security management.
Push System Pull System
Integrity Issues Loss or attenuation of signal due
to “blind spots”, out-of-range and
system black-outs.
Spurious location readings due to
external effects on signal
reception.
Malicious use of technologies to
confuse or jam signals (e.g. GPS
jammers).
Control of network to ensure data
received and processed is not
altered.
Re-coding of RFID tags once
they have been attached.
Re-location of readers.
Confidentiality Interception of signal by non-
authorized systems.
Ability to relate signal to physical
object (i.e. the container).
Ability to infer container content
from signal.
Ability to track container as it
moves from source to destination
and predict future location and
time.
Controlled access to readers.
Controlled access to proximity of
container within “scan range” of
reader.
Availability of technical
specification of implementation
e.g. RFID transmit frequencies,
range, etc.
Reconciliation of pallet contents
to RFID tag.
Availability Internal power source.
Dependent on availability of
network.
Network traffic.
Access to readers.
Power source for readers.
Frequency interference.
Table 2. Application of Push/Pull Model
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To illustrate how the logical models can be used for implementation we provide a brief description of implementation details
here. Push systems for containers can be readily implemented using radio-transmitting technologies such as cell-phones or
short-wave radios possibly coupled with GPS receivers. The device will transmit its location periodically, every 15 minutes
for example. Base stations or cell-towers will intercept the transmissions and pass the data onto an application which can use
the data to update the location of the container.
Pull systems for pallets can be implemented using passive RFID tags with low-frequency transmitters which can penetrate
the walls of the container. The RFID tags are activated when in the presence of a suitable reader which can record the time at
which  each tag  was  read  by  a  specific  reader  and send the  data  to  an  application  which  can  update  the  time at  which  the
container was read by a specific reader. The reader is in a fixed location known a-priori to the application: the exit gate of the
manufacturer, an in-transit location or the entrance to a storage facility, for example.
FUTURE RESEARCH
We assert that it is impossible to understand the complexities of mobile, decentralized systems architectures by looking at the
physical implementation of a system, one component at a time. We also assert that looking at the holistic system through only
a strategic lens misses many of the business process change issues associated with the specific uses of a particular
implementation.
We propose that security managers and researchers work together to identify new methods for bridging the gap between
strategic security guidelines and implementation specific guidance. This evolving research has demonstrated that using
simple diagrams of logical processes will result in identification of a more complete set of security vulnerabilities than using
top down, strategic frameworks or bottom up technology specific security controls. To complete this research project, we will
develop a fuller discussion of the differences and similarities across different types of LAS, include a more complete
description of common risks across LAS and expand our discussion on the value of logical models for assessing risk
associated with decentralized, mobile applications.
Much more research is needed in this area. Future research could involve refinement of the logical model presented here, and
development of additional logical models for other information systems architectures, as well as mapping of logical models
to specific top down frameworks at one end and bottom up technologies at the other end. Additional research is also needed
to further develop security frameworks and to identify the applicability of various security frameworks to different domains.
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